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Abstract
Background: Zoonotic infections, which transmit from animals to humans, form the majority of new human pathogens.
Following zoonotic transmission, the pathogen may already have, or may acquire, the ability to transmit from human to
human. With infections such as Lassa fever (LF), an often fatal, rodent-borne, hemorrhagic fever common in areas of West
Africa, rodent-to-rodent, rodent-to-human, human-to-human and even human-to-rodent transmission patterns are possible.
Indeed, large hospital-related outbreaks have been reported. Estimating the proportion of transmission due to human-to-
human routes and related patterns (e.g. existence of super-spreaders), in these scenarios is challenging, but essential for
planned interventions.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Here, we make use of an innovative modeling approach to analyze data from published
outbreaks and the number of LF hospitalized patients to Kenema Government Hospital in Sierra Leone to estimate the likely
contribution of human-to-human transmission. The analyses show that almost 20% of the cases at KGH are secondary cases
arising from human-to-human transmission. However, we found much of this transmission is associated with a
disproportionally large impact of a few individuals (‘super-spreaders’), as we found only 5% of human cases result in an
effective reproduction number (i.e. the average number of secondary cases per infectious case)w1, with a maximum value
up to 12.
Conclusions/Significance: This work explains the discrepancy between the sizes of reported LF outbreaks and a clinical
perception that human-to-human transmission is low. Future assessment of risks of LF and infection control guidelines
should take into account the potentially large impact of super-spreaders in human-to-human transmission. Our work
highlights several neglected topics in LF research, the occurrence and nature of super-spreading events and aspects of
social behavior in transmission and detection.
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Introduction
Diseases at the animal-human interface are in general subjected
to different modes of cross-species transmission: animal-to-animal,
animal-to-human, human-to-human and even human-to-animal.
Estimating the relative contribution of each is of fundamental
importance for the planning and implementation of appropriate
infection control and preventive measures. This can be an
extremely difficult task if humans and animals share the same
physical space, and/or if experimentation (e.g. to quantify the
probability of animal-to-animal transmission) is subjected to
serious limitations. This is the case of Lassa fever (LF), a rodent-
borne disease endemic in West Africa. Despite its clear zoonotic
origin, there are strong arguments, listed below, to hypothesize
that a significant proportion of the burden of LF in humans arises
from human-to-human transmission. The aim of this work is to
test whether or not patterns in the epidemic curve describing the
cases of LF observed in Sierra Leone [1], are compatible with
patterns observed in chains of pure human-to-human transmission
recorded in nosocomial and extra-nosocomial outbreaks [2,3].
Lassa fever is an acute, viral hemorrhagic disease caused by
Lassa fever virus (LASV), an enveloped RNA virus of the
Arenaviridae. The disease was first recognized in the village of
Lassa, Nigeria in 1969, which caused the death of two missionary-
nurses and the grave illness of a third [4]. However, cases
consistent with LF from the eastern part of Sierra Leone can be
traced back to 1956 [5]. Since the identification of LASV, human-
to-human transmission has been documented in several nosoco-
mial outbreaks (e.g. [2,3] and also [6] for a review), leading to an
initial perception that the virus was both highly contagious and
virulent [4]; this resulted in stringent requirements for contain-
ment of the patients [7]. Soon after, its zoonotic origin was
recognized and Mastomys natalensis, one of the most common
African rodents, was identified as the reservoir of the virus [8]. The
risk of nosocomial transmission was shown to be dramatically
reduced by using simple barrier nursing method [7,9–11],
suggesting that the risk of human-to-human transmission might
be negligible.
These findings support an apparent, modern-day consensus that
in the epidemiology of the disease, human-to-human transmission
plays a less important role compared to zoonotic transmission.
Accordingly, it has been suggested that patients with LF in non-
endemic countries should not be confined to biosafety level 4
containment [10], and patient containment guidelines issued by
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the UK Department
of Health and Social Security, in the past have been amended to
be less restrictive (see [11,12], also [13] and its previous versions).
This narrative concerning the relative importance of human-to-
human transmission for LASV, however, requires re-evaluation as
there are important indications of human-to-human transmission.
More precisely, one of the early nosocomial outbreaks, in Jos,
Nigeria (see [2], Fig. 1 and also the Supporting Information, S2
Text) was triggered by an index case that transmitted to possibly
15{23 others in the hospital, with no indication of iatrogenic
transfer. Further cases of extra-hospital transmission within a
single family (five from the same family, EE, EE2, SE, TI , and
FT who likely initiated the chain) were reported, here and
throughout we refer to this chain as an ‘extra-nosocomial’ chain.
Haas et al. [14] investigated secondary transmission after an
imported case of LF into Europe and found that one of 149
contacts that were tested serologically, a physician who examined
the patient on day 9 of illness, had become infected. The authors
concluded that, during the initial phase of symptomatic LF the risk
of transmission is low, but it may increase with progression of
disease and increasing viral excretion. Emond et al. [15] described
a case of LF in the UK in which the virus was isolated from urine
16 days after the acute phase had ended, despite not being
detected earlier. The virus may also be found in pharyngeal
secretions for 3{4 weeks after the onset of clinical signs [16]. In
an experimental model, Stephenson et al. [17] showed the ability
to infect guinea pigs and cynomolgus monkeys with LASV via the
respiratory route and Peters et al. [18] demonstrated fatal LASV
transmission to monkeys through being held in the same room for
12 days with inoculated rodents. Sagripanti et al. [19], in a dark
room at ambient laboratory temperatures controlled between
200C and 250C and 30{40% relative humidity, showed that the
time required for a 90% reduction in viral load of LASV in glass
containers wasw58 hours and was 9:7 days for a 99:99% relative
humidity. Also, Kerne´is et al. [20] identified that risk factors for
positive seroconversion to LASV included either having received a
medical injection, or having lived with someone displaying a
haemorrhage, in the previous twelve months. No factors related to
contact with rodents were identified. Similarly, McCormick et al.
[21] reported a lack of correlation between human LASV-specific
IgG prevalence and either the level of domestic infestation by
Mastomys, or the presence of LASV infection in Mastomys. These
observations, taken together, suggest that a significant (if perhaps
variable) proportion of the burden of LF might be associated with
human-to-human transmission.
Estimating the contribution of human-to-human transmission of
LASV and related patterns of transmission (e.g. existence of super-
spreaders) is of fundamental importance when considering risk
assessment and control of LF and related diseases such as the one
caused by the arenavirus, Lujo virus [22], not least because LF is
one of the more common haemorrhagic fevers exported from
endemic areas [23–28]. In addition, perceiving LF as essentially a
zoonotic disease only acquired from rodents with little or no
infection arising from human beings, may have prevented
investigations of the role, if any, of human-to-rodent transmission
(i.e. spillback) in the epidemiology of LF.
Understanding routes of transmission and the proportion of LF
cases resulting from human-to-human transmission is critical for
developing and prioritizing effective prevention and control
interventions, especially in the presence of large variation among
subjects in their capability of infecting. The current Ebola
outbreak has emphasised further the need for targeted biosecure
measures which distinguish managing hemorrhagic fever cases and
outbreaks from preventing spillover from reservoirs. This issue has
not previously been fully addressed for Lassa Fever. Traditional
approaches, such as cluster analysis, to distinguish human-to-
human transmission from pure zoonotic transmission cannot be
employed here due to the potential of clustering of infection in
households from common exposure to infected rodents in addition
to clustering arising from infected people. We overcome this
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problem by adapting other approaches [29,30], and using data
from nosocomial and extra-nosocomial outbreaks and hospitalized
patients in Kenema Governmental Hospital (KGH), Sierra Leone
[1]. We use these data to provide an estimation of the contribution
of human-to-human transmission to the Lassa fever occurrence in
endemic areas and to provide a more-robust assessment of the risk
of secondary spread from index cases.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
The Tulane University Institutional Review Board and the
Sierra Leone Ethics Committee approved the research [1].
Patients either approached KGH directly or were referred to the
KGH Lassa Ward from regional health centers or the hospital’s
general ward on the basis of suspicion of LF. All adult subjects
provided written informed consent for the analysis and publication
of anonymized laboratory and clinical data. A parent or guardian
of any child participant provided written informed consent on
their behalf. All data were anonymized prior to analysis.
Structure and rationale of the modeling approach
N Carey, Monath and co-workers [2,3] provided evidence of
nosocomial and extra-nosocomial chains that are examples of
human-to-human transmission of LASV. Based on these
early works[2,3] and on the arguments listed in the
introduction, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a proportion
Q of hospitalized patients in KGH (Fig. 2) contracted the
disease from a human source (see section ‘‘Available data and
evidence of human-to-human transmission’’).
N The next step was to estimate this proportion Q ensuring that
aspects of (e.g. the effective reproduction number) the
epidemic curve from KGH are compatible with those in
the observed chains [2,3].
N To this end, we employed and re-adapted the method of
Wallinga and Teunis [29], who developed a method to
calculate the effective reproduction number (which takes into
account depletion of susceptibles) for an epidemic curve. If
the network of transmission is known, no further information
is required (see section ‘‘The effective reproduction number
in the nosocomial and extra-nosocomial outbreaks’’). Other-
wise the distribution of the generation time, i.e. the time
between a primary case and a secondary case, needs to be
ascertained (see section ‘‘The effective reproduction number
for cases of hospitalised patients in KGH’’).
N An important feature of the approach of [29] is the option to
consider a fraction of cases in the curve as externally
imported, i.e. people being infected outside the community.
In the context of hospitalized patients in KGH, the cases
from animal-to-human transmission are interpreted as
externally imported cases, whose proportion is 1{Q. As
we don’t know which cases arises from zoonotic or human
origin, we randomly selected a fraction Q of the number of
hospitalized patients at the Lassa ward and considered this
subset of the epidemic curve as a pure human-to-human
chain of transmission. This random sampling was repeated
many times to ensure the findings are based on a reliable
statistics.
N We calculated i) a daily mean effective reproduction
numbers, R
Nos
and R
ExtraNos
(definition below and in the
glossary in S1 Text), associated with the nosocomial and
extra-nosocomial chains of pure human-to-human transmis-
sion [2,3] as well as the corresponding distributions of the
generation times; ii) based on these distributions of the
generation times we then estimated a daily mean effective
reproduction numbers, R(Q), associated to each subset,
consisting of a fraction Q of patients, of the epidemic curve
from KGH; iii) finally, by imposing equality of the two
r e p r o d u c t i o n n u m b e r s : e i t h e r R
Nos
~R(Q) o r
R
ExtraNos
~R(Q), we estimated the proportion of cases
arising from human-to-human transmission, Q.
Appropriateness of comparing data from Sierra Leone
with the Jos/Zorzor outbreaks. Like Kenema in Sierra
Leone, Jos and Zorzor are at the heart of the Nigerian and
Liberian endemic areas of LF occurrence and, as in Sierra Leone,
it is assumed that LASV has been circulating in these areas
historically [5,31,32]. This is supported by molecular evidence that
the Nigerian LASV strain is ancestral to the Sierra Leonean one
[33]. In addition, although studies in human prevalence of
antibodies to LASV exhibit variation amongst regions (e.g. low
values in coastal areas), in general human seroprevalence appears
to be similar in Nigeria and in the Mano River region (Guinea,
Sierra Leone, Liberia) [20,34–40].
Furthermore in recent decades, infection control has focused
essentially in minimizing nosocomial transmission, albeit with
partial success [41–43]. In particular, a study by Tobin et al. [42]
revealed a general lack of knowledge of barrier nursing among
health workers in rural areas. This problem is expected to be even
more persistent among non-professionals, suggesting that control
measures have not significantly changed since LF was discovered.
Hence despite these data sets being collected at quite different
points in time, health-care practices have not changed meaning-
fully over this time period.
Finally, the Jos/Zorzor outbreaks were exceptionally severe
disease outbreaks, therefore by analyzing only hospitalized patients
in KGH, we ensured that we are comparing equivalent situations.
Author Summary
Many pathogens have the ability to infect different
species. Lassa fever virus is an important example; this
virus infects a species of rodent in West Africa, and can
cause a severe disease in people. Lassa fever virus is
transmitted from rodent-to-rodent, rodent-to-human, hu-
man-to-human and perhaps human-to-rodent. So far, the
relative importance of these routes has not been assessed.
Here we focus on the risk for humans; undoubtedly, most
human infections are acquired by contact with rodents or
their urine, but the relative risk of rodent-to-human and
human-to-human transmission is unknown. We use math-
ematical modeling to address this. First, we identified Lassa
fever outbreaks known to be due to human-to-human
chains of transmission. Then, we looked at people
hospitalized with the disease in Kenema Government
Hospital, Sierra Leone (KGH), who could have been
infected either by rodents or humans. We asked, what
should the proportion of patients be who get infected by
humans, assuming the statistical patterns observed in the
human-to-human chains are the same in both instances?
We found that around 20% of patients with Lassa fever in
KGH probably acquired the disease from another person.
In addition, the patterns of disease in people suggest that
these 20% of cases are probably initiated by only a small
number of infected people (who could be thought of as
super-spreaders).
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Fig. 1. Nosocomial outbreaks. A: Diagrammatic representation of LF cases admitted at Jos Hospital, Nigeria (total duration of the outbreak 62
days), showing period of illness and interrelation among patients [2]. The horizontal bars represent each patient. The x-axis is the time expressed in
days from the start of the outbreak, when TS developed the illness (thus time 0 in the calculation corresponds to 25 December 1969). The grey
portion of the bars are the period between the onset of the symptoms and admission to hospital; the black portion of the bars are the period
between admission to hospital and discharge/death of the patients; the red thin lines are the period of exposure to the index case TS. The green bar
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These considerations justify the choice of comparing the data
from KGH with the extra-nosocomial outbreak that occurred in
Jos, while the appropriateness of comparing the KGH data with
the nosocomial cases in the Jos outbreak is one of the hypothesis
being tested in the current work.
Available data and evidence of human-to-human
transmission. We analyzed the data from two nosocomial LF
outbreaks: Jos, Nigeria in 1970 (23 cases) [2] and Zorzor, Liberia
in 1972 (11 cases) [3]. In the Jos outbreak, extra hospital infections
with no contact with the index case were observed (a single family
EE, EE2, SE, TI , and FT with the three children EE, EE2 and
SE who never visited the ward). These appear to be human-to-
human chains; sampling and testing of rodents near the homes of
LF patients in Jos, as well as in the larger geographic area, showed
no evidence of LASV in rodents [2], further supporting human-to-
human transmission maintaining these epidemics. Further details
of the two outbreaks and the full networks of contacts are
presented in the Supporting Information, S2 Text.
In contrast with many emerging zoonoses, the reported incidence of
LF in people is high in endemic areas, as reflected in data from KGH
in Sierra Leone [1] (Fig. 2), thus allowing a more robust analysis of the
transmission dynamics. KGH is the only health facility in Sierra Leone
where people can be diagnosed and treated for suspected LF. The
hospital facilities include an isolation ward specifically for LF patients
with a highly trained clinical staff equipped with appropriate personal
protective equipment. KGH records provide hospitalized patient data
(day of admission, day of discharge, etc.) for suspected and confirmed
cases of LF, divided by age, gender, ethnic group, location and other
factors [1].
We used data abstracted from patient medical charts and LF
diagnostic tests for 1002 suspected Lassa cases presenting to the KGH
Lassa Ward from 27th of April 2010 to the 31st of January 2012.
Among these subjects, 295 (Fig. 2) were confirmed as LF cases, i.e.
either subjects with acute infection (tested positive LF using an antigen-
based ELISA approach) or with recent LF (tested positive to IgM
antibodies) [1]. These data correspond to the most accurate and
complete set of patient records available at KGH. April 2010 was
chosen as the lower endpoint for our study sample due to significant
improvements in data quality. These improvements are largely
attributed to several NIH-funded research projects to develop and
improve the diagnostic tests for LF. Improvements in clinical data
quality can be attributed to more comprehensive questionnaire forms
and increased community outreach and surveillance activities.
The effective reproduction number in the nosocomial and
extra-nosocomial outbreaks. We calculated the effective repro-
duction number based on the observed dates of onset of symptoms,
start and duration of exposure to the index cases and start and duration
of exposure to all other cases. This information was directly obtained
from the literature [2,3], which provided detailed descriptions of the
network of contacts (Fig. 1 and S1 table in S2 Text). Inspired by the
work of Wallinga and Teunis [29], the relative likelihood qij that case i
has been infected by case j was calculated as:
qij~
tijP
k=itik
ð1Þ
here tnm is the time of exposure of case n to case m while case m is
infectious, i.e. the interval tnm is given by the intersection
tnm~t
S
m
T
t nm
E , where tSm~ t
bS
m ,t
eS
m
 
is the infectious period of
case m, calculated as the difference between the time teSm , when
the symptoms end (either because the patient recovers or dies)
and the time tbSm , when the symptoms begin; t
E
nm is the duration of
exposure of case n to case m provided by the literature [2,3]. It is
important to note that tnm, and thus qij , is explicitly time-
dependent, (Fig. 1.D). The index k represents all possible cases
within a nosocomial outbreak. Important underlying assump-
tions are: each event can independently start a new chain of
human-to-human transmission, beginning of infectiousness
coincides with the onset of symptoms, and infections occur with
equal probability at any time during the interval tnm. Accord-
ingly, the sum RNosj (tj)~
P
i qij over all cases i, represents the
individual effective reproduction number for case j at the time tj
when the case arises. If multiple cases are observed at the same
time tj , then R
Nos
j (tj) is averaged appropriately. To increase the
sample size and improve the estimation, the duration of the
symptoms of LF and the period spent at the hospital associated
with each patient were randomly rearranged among the 23 cases
(Fig. 1.C), then the ensemble average individual effective repro-
duction number was calculated based on 100 of these permuta-
tions. The network of contacts was kept the same. The identical
approach was used to calculate the effective reproduction
number, RExtraNosj (tj), for the extra-nosocomial situation, with
the network of contacts restricted to the family TI , EE, EE2, SE
and FT who presumably initiated the chain. We use the notation
RNosInd and R
ExtraNos
Ind to indicate the set of all individual effective
reproduction numbers for the nosocomial and extra-nosocomial
cases respectively, while the total effective reproduction numbers
RNos and RExtraNos represent the corresponding average number
of cases during the entire outbreak, i.e. RNos~
P
j R
Nos
j (tj) and
RExtra Nos~
P
j R
Extra Nos
j (tj) respectively. To adjust for the
different duration expected in different outbreaks, we calculate
a daily mean effective reproduction number as
R
Nos
~
P
j R
Nos
j =T
Nos and R
ExtraNos
~
P
j R
ExtraNos
j =T
ExtraNos
where TNos and TExtraNos are the typical duration of the
nosocomial and extra-nosocomial outbreaks.
The correctness of the approach was corroborated by perform-
ing the same analysis but by imposing that each case is exposed
only to the index case. For the situation in Jos, the individual
reproduction numbers were zero for all cases except for TS which
results in 15, i.e. the only cases exposed to TS and marked with a
thin red line in Fig. 1.
The distribution of the quantity tnm is interpreted as the
distribution of the generation time, i.e. the time between a primary
case and a secondary case, and it is presented in Figs. 3.C and 3.D
(see also Figures S2, S3, S4 and S5 in S2 Text).
The effective reproduction number for cases of
hospitalised patients in KGH. Following the approach of
Wallinga and Teunis (see [29,30] and their appendix for validation
of the procedure), the relative likelihood that case i has been infected by
case j, given their difference in time of symptom onset ~tij ,
represent the time when the patient was at the ward for unrelated illness. Note, the same diagram in [2] present an extra case, JT, which is not
included here. This case refers to Dr. Jeanette M. Troup one of the first scientists working on Lassa Fever Virus, who contracted the disease from an
autopsy accident incurred during examination of one of the fatal cases. B: Diagrammatic representation of LF cases admitted at Zorzor Hospital (total
duration of the outbreak 35 days), Liberia, showing period of illness and interrelation among patients [3]. C: As in Fig. 1.A, but the periods of illness
(symptoms plus time at hospital) are randomly permuted. The contact network is kept the same. D: An example of how the time tnm was calculated.
In this particular case tnm~t
eE
nm{t
bS
m if t
eE
nmƒtƒtbSm and 0 otherwise, where teEnm is the time when case n is no longer exposed to case m.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003398.g001
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approximated here as the difference in time of admission to hospital, is
then the likelihood that case i has been infected by case j, normalized
by the likelihood that case i has been infected by any other case k
pij~
w(~tij)P
i=kw(~tik)
ð2Þ
where ~w(~tij) is the distribution for the generation interval and it is
assumed to be the empirical distribution obtained from the nosocomial
and extra-nosocomial outbreaks (shown in Figs. 3.C and 3.D). The
effective reproduction number for case j is the sum over all cases i,
weighted by the relative likelihood that case i has been infected by case
j
Rj(tj)~
Xn
i~1
pij ð3Þ
This quantity depends on the time tj when case j occurs. The
set of all i cases are obtained by the epidemic curve, describing
the daily number of reported cases by date of symptom onset
(Fig. 2), n is the total number of reported cases. Underlying this
calculation is the assumption that the spread of the disease
occurs through human-to-human transmission only, however, a
substantial proportion of cases, 1{Q, is expected to be due to
Fig. 2. Epidemic curve. Daily number of referred/visiting patients at KGH (confirmed cases only) from the 27th of April 2010 to the 31st of January
2012, [1].
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003398.g002
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zoonotic transmission, i.e. only through contacts with the
rodent population, which can be considered as cases that have
contracted infection from outside the population. These,
therefore, cannot be regarded as secondary-tertiary etc. cases,
although they can initiate a human-to-human chain. Under
these circumstances, the effective reproduction number in
equation (3) must be calculated by removing these n(1{Q)
imported cases, i.e.
Fig. 3. Individual effective reproduction number and generation time. Box-plot for the individual RNosj for the nosocomial outbreak
described in [2] based on the 100 permutations of the duration of illness. It shows the first and third percentiles, the minimum and maximum values,
the median, and outliers (red dots). The dashed line represents the case when the effective reproduction number is equal to 1. A: nosocomial
outbreak in Jos [2]. B: nosocomial outbreak in Zorzor [3]. C: Distribution of generation time for the two nosocomial outbreaks. The statistics are based
on the 100 permutations of the duration of illness. D: Distribution of generation time for extra-nosocomial cases. The statistics are based on the 100
permutations of the duration of illness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003398.g003
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Rj(Q)~
XnQ
i~1
pij ð4Þ
The set of all individual effective reproduction numbers is
indicated by RInd , while R(Q) is the total effective reproduction
number, i.e. R(Q)~
P
j Rj(Q), where to simplify the notation we
dropped the dependency on tj . This value represents the average
number of cases during the entire epidemic compatible with the
particular generation time. As above, we averaged to obtain the
daily mean effective reproduction number R(Q)~
P
j Rj(Q)=T
where T is the duration of the epidemics. The calculations were
carried out by using the R package R0, provided by Obadia and
co-authors [30,44].
We compared two published outbreaks to illustrate the likely
bounds of human to human transmission. Initially, we assumed
that the extent of human-to-human transmission in nosocomial
outbreaks in Jos and Zorzor [2,3] represent the general situation in
an endemic area. Alternatively, we rejected this assumption and
considered only the out of hospital human-to-human transmission
in Jos (five from the same family, TI , EE, EE2, SE and FT who
initiated the chain), as being representative of the general endemic
situation. We estimated the generation number and the mean
nosocomial reproduction numbers for these two alternatives. By
imposing equality with the mean nosocomial reproduction
numbers (either R(Q)~R
Nos
or R(Q)~R
ExtraNos
), we inferred
the proportion Q.
To allow comparison with the effective reproduction
number for the Kenema data, which by definition is based
only on outbreaks where the primary case is assumed to be
among those reported [29], the index patients TS and GA
from the Jos and Zorzor outbreaks were assumed to be
secondary cases to unreported human cases. On the grounds of
realism, and also computational economy, the epidemic
curve from KGH (Fig. 2) is assumed to be a collection of
multiple chains of mean duration T , rather than a 2-year
long un-interrupted epidemic. The starting times of each
human-to-human chain were randomly chosen within the 2{
year period of the KGH epidemic curve. Similarly, as humans
and rodents share the same physical space, cross-species
transmission can occur at any time, thus the n(1{Q) imported
cases were randomly chosen from the network of contacts. For
each value of Q, the ensemble sample of the simulations was
300.
Results
Effective reproduction number for nosocomial outbreaks
Figs. 3.A and 3.B show the effective reproduction number for
each patient for the two nosocomial outbreaks respectively. As
expected, the largest values are associated with the index case TS
and GA for the Jos and Zorzor outbreaks, respectively. In several
cases, however, the effective reproduction number w1; particu-
larly important is case FT in the Jos outbreak with an effective
reproduction number &3, who most likely initiated extra-
nosocomial transmission in her family.
Estimating the contribution of human-to-human
transmission
Fig. 4 shows the total effective reproduction number R(Q) and
its daily mean R(Q) for the cases in KGH, vs the estimated
proportion Q of cases due to human-to-human transmission. The
shaded grey area covers the range between 25th and 75th
percentiles arising from the 300 simulations for each value of Q.
The predictions were then compared with the total effective
reproduction number (or with the equivalent daily mean), in the
nosocomial outbreaks RNos (or R
Nos
) based on the full network of
cases and with the extra-nosocomial cases in Jos alone RExtraNos (or
R
ExtraNos
). For the full network of cases, the mean nosocomial
reproduction number was higher than the mean KGH one,
implying that the severe hospital outbreaks ought to be seen as
exceptional circumstances. In contrast, the daily mean effective
reproduction number arising from the Jos extra-hospital cases (due
only to human-to-human transmission) was entirely compatible
with the daily mean KGH effective reproduction number if we
allow a proportion of cases to be due to human-to-human
transmission Q&20%. Based on the 25th and 75th percentiles in
the predictions for the reproduction number R(Q), the lower and
upper estimates for the proportion of human-to-human transmis-
sion are &15% and &30% respectively.
Quantifying the impact of the super-spreaders
Super-spreaders are individuals who can infect a dispropor-
tionately large pool of susceptibles [45]. Here, super-spreading
events are identified and quantified by analyzing how the
effective reproduction number is distributed. The distribution of
the individual effective reproduction numbers for the Jos and
Zorzor outbreaks, based on the 100 permutations of the duration
of illness, is shown in Fig. 5.A. Although 85% of the predictions
for individual RNosIndv1, there is a fat tailed distribution, with
extreme values of RNosIndv12. Similar patterns are observed for
KGH cases for the individual effective reproduction number
RInd . As shown in Fig. 5.B and 5.C, the distribution of the
individual and total, effective reproduction numbers, RInd and R
appears to have a fat-tailed distribution, especially for larger
values of Q.
A simple approach to evaluate the risk of super-spreaders is to
invoke the so-called ‘20/80 rule’ (whereby 20% of cases cause 80%
of transmission, see [45,46]). To this end, for different values of the
contribution of human-to-human transmission, Q, we calculated i)
the proportion of cases when RIndw1 (Fig. 6.A), and ii) its
proportional impact, given by the expected, relative number of
secondary cases generated by this proportion (see Fig. 6.B for
further explanations); the maximum RInd in the simulations was
also recorded. For a contribution of human-to-human transmis-
sion in the region of 20%, only 1% of realizations gave RIndw1,
but they are, on average, responsible for 20% of secondary cases,
with a maximum RInd§5. In an extreme situation, when the
disease is transmitted only by humans, &14% of cases are
responsible for the &77% of secondary cases with a maximum R
up to &10, which resembles the ‘20/80 rule’.
More sophisticated ways to assess the risk of super-spreaders are
presented in the S2 Text. In particular, we fitted the distribution
for the individual effective reproduction number RInd from KGH
with an exponential and a log-normal distribution. The observed
KGH distribution is ‘fatter’ than the corresponding exponential fit,
although not as heavy as the log-normal. Furthermore we fitted
two standard discrete distributions, the Poisson, representative of
thin-tailed distributions, and the negative-binomial, representative
of fat-tailed distributions, with the distribution for the integer part
(as we are considering discrete distributions) of R, i.e. the average
number of cases during the entire epidemic. As can be seen, the
last distribution is better fitted by a negative-binomial distribution,
especially for the tail (S6 Figure in S2 Text).
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Sensitivity of the predictions
Effect of the duration of epidemics. Different values for
the typical duration of a human-to-human chain, T , were
explored. As expected, the longer the duration, T , the larger the
availability of susceptibles and the higher the effective reproduc-
tion number. However, when the effective reproduction number is
rescaled by the duration of the epidemics, i.e. the daily mean
effective reproduction number R(Q), all the predictions are
similar. This can be seen by comparing the plots
R(Q)~R(Q)=T in Figs. 4.B (T~33:5 days), 4.D (T~62 days)
and S1 Figure in S2 Text (T~124 days).
Based on this invariance, we can infer the proportion Q,
irrespective of the choice of the mean duration T , provided that
we know the typical duration of the nosocomial and extra-
nosocomial chains TNos and TExtraNos. For the nosocomial case, a
reasonable choice is TNos~33:5 days, which is the average
duration of nosocomial outbreaks observed in Jos and Zorzor
hospitals (44 and 23 days respectively, the last days correspond to
when the last person developed symptoms). For the extra-
nosocomial chains the choice is less clear, as the member of the
family were already in contact with the index case FT before she
developed symptoms, and shedding of the virus could happen any
time before symptom onset. Therefore we made a conservative
choice of T~62 days which corresponds to the maximum
duration of the Jos outbreak (here the last day corresponds to
when case SE recovered). Any shorter choice of the duration
TExtraNos, will result in a larger value of the proportion Q (for
instance if the typical duration of the outbreak is 50 days, i.e.
including while TS was at the hospital, we found that Q&26%
instead of &20% while the estimates based on the intersection
with the 25th-percentile and 75th-percentile were &19% and
&38% respectively rather than &15% and &30%), which
reinforces the key message of this current work that a significant
proportion of cases of LF arises from human-to-human transmis-
sion.
Effect of the distribution of the generation times. The
robustness of the approach was tested by considering different
distributions for the generation time. We considered i) the
distribution of generation time arising from the entire network,
ii) the distribution arising from the particular subset of the data
corresponding to the extra-nosocomial cases TI , EE, EE2, SE
and FT , iii) a gamma distribution with the same empirical mean
and variance, iv) the empirical distribution by removing part of the
tail, v) a ‘stretched’ distribution by multiplying the empirical
generation times by a factor 2 to allow for a longer shedding of the
virus, and vi) a ‘shrunk’ distribution by multiplying the empirical
generation times by a factor 0:5. In general, each of these methods
had limited effects on the predictions (see S2 Figure in S2 Text, S3
Figure in S2 Text, S4 Figure in S2 Text, and S5 Figure in S2
Text).
Discussion
Disentangling the contribution of different hosts in spreading a
zoonotic, emerging disease is a key challenge for determining
effective, proportionate public health and safety measures. Such a
conundrum has steered a scientific debate on LF, which appears to
fluctuate around whether or not human-to-human transmission
plays a major role compared to rodent-to-human transmission.
The current work reconciles these two opposing paradigms. Here,
we adopted a relatively simple mathematical approach to analyze
data of hospitalized patients in KGH, Sierra Leone. The daily
mean effective reproduction numbers, R, observed in the
nosocomial outbreaks (only human-to-human transmission) are
much larger, and thus incompatible, with the ones estimated from
the data from KGH, even if we assume 100% human-to-human
transmission. If we regard the extra-nosocomial cases observed in
the Jos outbreak as representative of disease transmission in an
endemic area, then a significant proportion of LF cases (&20%)
arise from human-to-human transmission. A significant proportion
of these secondary cases, however, are attributable to a few events
with disproportionately large effective reproduction numbers:
super-spreading events. In general, the distributions of the
individual reproductive number, RInd , and the average number
of cases during an epidemic, R, exhibits a tail heavier than the
exponential or Poisson distributions, here used as benchmarks for
thin-tailed distributions. This reveal over-dispersion indicating the
presence of super-spreading events.
These results have implications for clinical practice and policy.
Super-spreading occurrences appear not to be exceptional for
infectious diseases [46,47]. According to this perspective, the lack
of recorded secondary cases in Britain after the importation of
confirmed cases of LF [7,12] should not be regarded as proof of
absence of human-to-human transmission. Any future assessment
of the associated risk of LF and formulation of patient containment
guidelines [13], therefore, should take into account the fat-tail
nature of the underlying distribution of individual reproduction
number.
Super-spreading events have been documented for many
infectious diseases [45,46], including tuberculosis [48], measles
[49] and SARS [50–52]. The underlying reasons for super-
spreading are not fully understood, but include amount of
pathogen excreted, length of the infectious period, social
behavior and environmental factors. Understanding the mech-
anisms of super-spreaders in LF requires an understanding of all
of these factors, but transmission of LASV is not well
characterized. In the Jos outbreak, Carey et al. [2] speculated
that the severe pulmonary involvement of the index case and the
location of her bed could cause airborne spread of virus to the
rest of the ward. The long persistence of viruria, even during the
recovery period, could facilitate transmission of LASV to other
people or to the rodent reservoir host, especially in rural
settlements in areas of West Africa where sanitary facilities are
limited. Participatory modeling and ethnographic research [53]
would be an invaluable tool to assess the variety of practices and
settings in which people come into contact with each other’s
urine and other body fluids, perceptions of risk, and approaches
to hygiene. Apart the work of Stephenson et al. [17] and Peter et
al. [18], we are not aware of specific experiments aimed to test
routes of LASV transmission. Studies on environmental con-
tamination are also required to explore if human-to-rodent
transmission is important for the maintenance or spread of LASV
infection [6].
Limitations of this study and future work
The current model is based on the assumption that the
distribution of the generation times observed in the extra-
nosocomial outbreak is representative of the generation times in
the Sierra Leonean situations. This is probably reasonable, but
public health measures may impact on this in the future. The
predictions are based on the assumption of uniform mixing, i.e.
each case from KGH is potentially in contact with each other case.
Although this is a reasonable assumption, considering the large
human mobility in Sierra Leone, for livelihoods, work and trade,
social visits and events [54], it will overestimate R. In addition,
there is likely to be incomplete reporting which will underestimate
R. Although the two factors might compensate for each other, if
KGH could reduce reporting bias and increase information on
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network contacts, it would be highly beneficial to studies such as
this, especially as human mobility and overcrowding has been
associated with an amplification of LF [31]. This represents a
further area where participatory modeling/ethnographic research is
much needed to gather information on actual patterns of mobility
and social networking, and hence potential contact patterns.
Other methods are possible, for example cluster-based inference
of the reproduction number (see e.g. [55,56]) is a promising
approach. In the current context, Kerne´is et al. [20] provided
detailed information on prevalence and risk factors of Lassa (e.g.
history of collecting, cutting and eating rats) stratified by age. In
addition, the age distribution from KGH is also available. These
Fig. 4. Contribution of human-to-human transmission. Mean value of the total effective reproduction number, R and its daily mean, R, for the
KGH epidemic curve vs the proportion Q of cases due to human-to-human transmission (blue line). The shaded grey area covers the range between
the 25th and 75th percentiles in R and/or R; the dashed red line represents the mean, nosocomial, effective reproduction number. A and B: RNos and
R
Nos
based on the full networks (in Jos and in Zorzor) of nosocomial cases; T~33:5 days. C and D: RExtraNos and R
ExtraNos
based on the extra-
nosocomial cases in Jos; T~62 days.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003398.g004
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data could be combined together to build a matrix of transmission
rates among age-groups (as done in [55,56]) and between rodents
and each age-group with values based on the findings of Kerne´is
et al. [20].
For the KGH data, the difference in time of onset of symptoms
was approximated here with the difference in time of visit/referral
to the hospital following disease onset. This assumption can be an
important source of error as patterns of health seeking behavior
might vary largely among the Sierra Leonean population. For
example, a particular group of the population might favor
traditional medicine and approach institutional health care only
at a late stage of the disease. Patients from rural areas might be
subjected to further delay due to poor infrastructure. Health
seeking behavior is perhaps one the most fruitful areas where
participatory modeling and ethnographic research have been
successfully employed and should be considered in the present
context.
Fig. 5. Impact of super-spreaders I. A: Distribution of all individual
RNos for both nosocomial outbreaks, based on the 100 permutations of
the duration of illness. Mean value of the joint data: 0:73, median: 0:04,
maximum: 11:7, proportion of cases when RNosw5: 4:2%, proportion of
cases when RNosw10: 1:2%. B: Distribution of the effective reproduc-
tion number for cases of hospitalized patients in KGH for different
values of the contribution of human-to-human transmission, Q, the
corresponding data for the extra-nosocomial (100 permutation based
on FT , TI , EE, EE2, SE cases in Jos) and all nosocomial outbreaks
(based on all Jos and Zorzor cases) are also shown. C: Distribution of the
total effective reproduction number, i.e. the average number of cases
during the entire duration of the epidemic for different values the
contribution of human-to-human transmission, Q.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003398.g005
Fig. 6. Impact of super-spreaders II. A: proportion of cases when
the individual effective reproduction number RInd is greater than one.
(i.e. the ratio of the cardinalities of SO and S, where S is set of all
simulated RInd and SO the subset of cases when RInd is greater than
one). B: the expected, relative number of cases generated by this
proportion. (i.e. the fraction of the areas of
P
SO RInd=
P
S RInd )
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003398.g006
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The estimations here are based on the assumption that
probability of cross-species transmission occurs at random
throughout outbreaks, although these events are expected to be
strongly driven by a multitude of interacting causes, including
ecological (e.g. seasonality in the abundance of the reservoir),
epidemiological (e.g. seasonality in the prevalence of the patho-
gen), genetic variation (e.g. broad set of pathogen life histories) and
socio-economic (e.g. the practice of burning the fields after
harvesting affecting the ecology and dispersal patterns of M.
natalensis) factors.
The estimation of the proportion of human-to-human trans-
mission was based on the assumption that the typical duration of a
chain of transmission is equal to the duration of the extra-
nosocomial outbreak. As this information was only approximately
known, we made the prudent choice that the duration of the extra-
nosocomial outbreak was the entire extent of the outbreak in Jos,
which was the maximum value from the data available. This led to
a conservative estimation of Q&20%. Despite some inevitable
inaccuracies, all of our alternative/additional tests confirm that a
significant proportion (in the region of 20% or greater) of the
burden of LF is due to human-to-human transmission.
The basis of our work is that, to the best of our knowledge, the
nosocomial and extra-nosocomial outbreaks in Jos and Zorzor
were instances of pure human-to-human chains. This is a message
too important to be neglected. Despite some improvement in the
implementation of barrier nursing in hospital structures, there is
no evidence that in the last decades prophylactic measures have
significantly changed in ordinary situations as in households and
villages, and this issue has been abundantly clear during the
current Ebola outbreak in West Africa. It is therefore reasonable
that chains of human-to-human transmission, like the extra-
nosocomial outbreak that occurred in Jos more than 40 years ago
are much more common than expected.
This study highlights the need for integrated One Health
approaches to model zoonoses more effectively in order to better-
inform disease control and prevention. Zoonoses remain a
neglected group of diseases, under-prioritised in national and
international health systems.
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